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Abstract	   	  Two	  studies	  investigated	  the	  relationship	  between	  inattentional	  blindness,	  paranormal	  belief/experience,	  absorption,	  and	  working	  memory	  capacity	  (WMC).	  ‘Inattentional	  blindness’	  (IB)	  refers	  to	  the	  failure	  to	  consciously	  register	  an	  unexpected	  visual	  stimulus	  or	  event	  when	  attention	  is	  diverted	  to	  a	  different	  task.	  Absorption	  is	  a	  highly	  focused	  state	  where	  individuals	  are	  unaware	  of	  stimuli	  outside	  of	  attentional	  focus	  and	  is	  linked	  with	  paranormal	  belief.	  It	  was	  predicted	  that	  IB	  individuals	  would	  have	  higher	  absorption	  scores	  and	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  paranormal	  than	  non-­‐inattentionally	  blind	  (NIBs)	  individuals.	  In	  both	  studies,	  IBs	  had	  higher	  absorption	  and	  paranormal	  belief	  scores	  than	  NIBs,	  as	  predicted.	  In	  addition,	  Study	  2	  measured	  WMC.	  Although	  absorption	  predicted	  IB,	  when	  WMC	  and	  paranormal	  belief	  were	  entered	  into	  the	  analysis,	  only	  WMC	  predicted	  IB	  with	  IBs	  having	  lower	  WMC	  than	  NIBs.	  These	  data	  offer	  support	  for	  a	  cognitive	  deficit	  account	  of	  paranormal	  belief.	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Inattentional	  Blindness,	  Absorption,	  Working	  Memory	  Capacity,	   	  and	  Paranormal	  Belief	  It	  is	  well	  documented	  that	  objects	  appearing	  in	  our	  visual	  field	  often	  go	  unnoticed,	  and	  this	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  happen	  if	  we	  are	  busily	  involved	  in	  a	  resource-­‐consuming	  activity.	  Such	  a	  failure	  of	  attention	  has	  been	  called	  Inattentional	  Blindness	  (IB)	  by	  Mack	  and	  Rock	  (1998)	  and	  is	  a	  frequent	  cause	  of	  errors	  in	  eyewitness	  testimony.	  IB	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  classic	  ‘Gorillas	  in	  Our	  Midst’	  (Simons	  &	  Chabris,	  1999)	  study	  where	  a	  person	  in	  a	  gorilla	  suit	  is	  not	  seen	  by	  approximately	  half	  of	  the	  participants	  who	  are	  engaged	  in	  counting	  the	  number	  of	  ball	  passes	  between	  people	  in	  white	  shirts	  while	  simultaneously	  ignoring	  ball	  passes	  between	  people	  in	  black	  shirts.	  More	  recently,	  Most	  et	  al.	  (2001,	  see	  Simons,	  2003)	  developed	  an	  IB	  task	  in	  which	  black	  and	  white	  letters	  bounce	  around	  a	  screen	  and	  participants	  are	  required	  to	  monitor	  targets	  (white	  letters)	  but	  ignore	  distractors	  (black	  letters).	  An	  unexpected	  red	  cross	  arriving	  on	  the	  scene	  often	  goes	  unnoticed.	  Most,	  Scholl,	  Clifford,	  and	  Simons	  (2005)	  propose	  that	  inattentional	  blindness	  is	  the	  converse	  phenomenon	  of	  attentional	  capture	  and	  put	  forward	  a	  model	  based	  on	  Neisser’s	  (1976)	  ‘perceptual	  cycle’	  conceptualization.	  Whether	  the	  unexpected	  stimulus	  is	  noticed	  mainly	  depends	  on	  the	  physical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  display	  (e.g.,	  proximity	  and	  conspicuity;	  see	  Jensen,	  Yao,	  Street,	  &	  Simons,	  2011;	  Mack	  &	  Rock,	  1998)	  but	  expectation	  and	  attentional	  state	  are	  also	  influential	  in	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  unexpected	  item	  will	  be	  seen.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  inattentional	  blindness	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  both	  top-­‐down	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  factors.	  However,	  differences	  between	  individuals	  also	  play	  a	  part	  (e.g.,	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Clifasefi,	  Takarangi,	  &	  Bergman,	  2006;	  Hannon	  &	  Richards,	  2010;	  Memmert,	  2006).	  In	  a	  series	  of	  experiments,	  people	  with	  low	  working	  memory	  resources	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  inattentionally	  blind	  (Hannon	  &	  Richards,	  2010;	  Richards,	  Hannon,	  &	  Derakshan,	  2010;	  Richards,	  Hannon,	  &	  Vitkovitch,	  2012).	  We	  have	  also	  observed	  difference	  in	  low-­‐level	  saliency	  detection,	  with	  people	  who	  are	  inattentionally	  blind	  being	  less	  sensitive	  to	  stimuli	  with	  low	  saliency	  levels	  compared	  to	  non-­‐inattentionally	  blind	  individuals	  (Papera,	  Cooper,	  &	  Richards,	  2013).	  Another	  candidate	  for	  predicting	  IB	  status	  is	  absorption	  which	  is	  a	  highly	  focused	  attentional	  state	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  is	  unaware	  of	  unattended	  objects	  or	  events.	  Susceptibility	  to	  such	  states	  can	  be	  measured	  as	  a	  personality	  trait,	  indicating	  “the	  tendency	  to	  become	  engrossed	  in	  one’s	  ongoing	  experience”	  (Kerns,	  Karcher,	  Raghavan,	  &	  Berenbaum,	  2014,	  p.	  67),	  using	  Tellegen’s	  Absorption	  Scale	  (TAS;	  Tellegen	  &	  Atkinson,	  1974).	  We	  therefore	  predict	  that	  individuals	  who	  are	  IB	  in	  a	  sustained	  attention	  task	  would	  score	  higher	  than	  others	  on	  this	  scale.	   	  	   Moreover,	  absorption	  correlates,	  albeit	  moderately,	  with	  both	  paranormal	  belief	  (Glicksohn	  &	  Barrett,	  2003;	  Nadon	  &	  Kihlstrom,	  1987;	  Palmer	  &	  Van	  Der	  Velden,	  1983)	  and	  reports	  of	  subjective	  paranormal	  (Glicksohn,	  1990;	  Irwin,	  1985)	  and	  mystical	  experiences	  (Mathes,	  1982;	  Spanos	  &	  Moretti,	  1988).	  If	  IB	  status	  is	  related	  to	  absorption,	  we	  might	  therefore	  predict	  that	  IB	  participants	  would	  have	  higher	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  scores	  than	  non-­‐inattentionally	  blind	  participants	  (NIBs).	  Many	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  experiences	  are	  based	  upon	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ‘experiencer’	  could	  not	  explain	  a	  particular	  event,	  e.g.,	  apparently	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inexplicable	  movement	  of	  an	  inanimate	  object.	  Often	  a	  mundane	  explanation	  would	  plausibly	  solve	  the	  mystery	  by	  simply	  assuming	  that	  the	  claimant	  had	  failed	  to	  process	  some	  aspect	  of	  the	  original	  situation	  (e.g.,	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  agent	  to	  move	  the	  object).	   	  This	  is	  only	  one	  way	  in	  which	  absorption	  may	  lead	  to	  reports	  of	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  experiences.	  As	  shown	  by	  Glicksohn	  and	  Barrett	  (2003),	  absorption	  is	  also	  correlated	  with	  hallucinatory	  tendencies	  that	  could	  also	  account	  for	  many	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  encounters.	  Furthermore,	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  evidence	  (for	  reviews,	  see	  French,	  2003;	  French	  &	  Wilson,	  2006;	  French	  &	  Stone,	  2014)	  indicates	  that	  absorption	  correlates	  not	  only	  with	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  reports	  of	  subjective	  paranormal	  experiences	  but	  also	  with	  susceptibility	  to	  false	  memories.	  This	  raises	  the	  possibility	  that	  at	  least	  some	  reports	  of	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  experiences	  might	  be	  based	  upon	  false	  memories	  of	  apparent	  events	  that	  in	  fact	  never	  took	  place	  at	  all.	  Reality	  monitoring	  refers	  to	  the	  psychological	  processes	  involved	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  mental	  events	  that	  are	  internally	  generated	  and	  those	  that	  are	  the	  result	  of	  external	  events	  (Johnson	  &	  Raye,	  1981;	  Johnson,	  Hashtroudi,	  &	  Lidsay,	  1993).	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  absorption	  is	  related	  to	  reality	  monitoring	  in	  both	  the	  perceptual	  domain	  (leading	  to	  hallucinatory	  experiences)	  and	  the	  memory	  domain	  (leading	  to	  false	  memories).	  	   Believers	  in	  the	  paranormal	  tend	  to	  be	  poorer	  eyewitnesses	  in	  anomalistic	  contexts	  than	  are	  non-­‐believers	  and	  are	  less	  able	  to	  accurately	  report	  important	  details	  of	  anomalous	  events	  (e.g.,	  Wiseman	  &	  Morris,	  1995).	  In	  fact,	  the	  first	  ever	  systematic	  study	  of	  the	  unreliability	  of	  eyewitness	  testimony	  was	  carried	  out	  by	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Davey	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  faked	  séance	  (Hodgson	  &	  Davey,	  1887)	  and	  such	  studies	  have	  been	  repeated	  more	  recently	  (e.g.,	  Wiseman,	  Greening,	  &	  Smith	  2003).	  Amongst	  other	  findings,	  these	  studies	  show	  that	  believers	  in	  the	  paranormal	  are	  more	  susceptible	  to	  the	  power	  of	  suggestion	  in	  such	  contexts	  than	  non-­‐believers.	  For	  example,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  report	  stationary	  objects	  as	  having	  moved	  if	  such	  a	  suggestion	  is	  made	  by	  the	  ‘psychic’	  (see	  also,	  Wiseman	  &	  Greening,	  2005).	  It	  is	  plausible	  to	  argue	  that	  absorption	  plays	  a	  dual	  role	  in	  such	  situations.	  First,	  intense	  attentional	  focus	  on	  only	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  situation	  means	  that	  the	  true	  explanation	  for	  an	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  event	  (e.g.,	  sleight	  of	  hand)	  is	  missed.	  Secondly,	  mental	  events	  generated	  via	  intense	  imagination	  in	  response	  to	  external	  suggestion	  are	  confused	  with	  objectively	  real	  events.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  current	  study	  is	  solely	  on	  the	  possibility	  that	  high	  absorption	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  miss	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  external	  environment	  while	  concentrating	  on	  other	  aspects.	   	   	  Interestingly,	  an	  early	  demonstration	  of	  IB	  (although	  not	  identified	  as	  such)	  took	  place	  in	  an	  anomalistic	  context.	  Cornell	  (1960)	  reports	  experiments	  in	  which	  he	  dressed	  as	  a	  ghost	  in	  a	  butter	  muslin	  sheet	  and	  walked	  across	  a	  cinema	  screen	  whilst	  the	  audience	  watched	  the	  film.	  Although	  in	  full	  view	  for	  50	  seconds,	  32%	  of	  the	  audience	  did	  not	  see	  the	  ‘apparition’.	  Ironically,	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  situations	  one	  could	  imagine	  where	  IB	  would	  make	  an	  individual	  less	  likely	  to	  report	  an	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  event.	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In	  this	  study,	  we	  take	  measures	  of	  both	  absorption	  and	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  to	  see	  if	  they	  predict	  IB	  status.	  We	  predict	  that	  IBs	  would	  have	  higher	  scores	  on	  both	  absorption	  and	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  then	  NIBs.	  Method	  
Participants	  A	  total	  of	  98	  participants	  were	  tested	  but	  6	  were	  excluded	  due	  to	  IB	  familiarity	  and	  one	  was	  excluded	  for	  omitting	  several	  items	  on	  the	  TAS	  questionnaire),	  which	  left	  91	  participants	  (age	  range	  18	  to	  60;	  mean	  age	  =	  21.49	  years,	  SD	  =	  6.12;	  74	  females)	  who	  were	  included	  in	  the	  analyses.	  
Stimuli	  &	  Materials	  
Tellegen	  Absorption	  Scale	  (TAS;	  Tellegen	  &	  Atkinson,	  1974):	  The	  TAS	  is	  a	  34-­‐item	  true-­‐false	  scale	  measuring	  openness	  to	  experience	  and	  cognitive-­‐affective	  alterations	  across	  a	  range	  of	  situations	  (scores	  range	  from	  0	  to	  34).	  Example	  items	  are	  “Sometimes	  I	  feel	  and	  experience	  things	  as	  I	  did	  when	  I	  was	  a	  child”,	  “I	  can	  be	  greatly	  moved	  by	  eloquent	  or	  poetic	  language”,	  and	  “I	  like	  to	  watch	  cloud	  shapes	  change	  in	  the	  sky”.	  The	  scale	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  reliable	  and	  valid.	  For	  example,	  Glicksohn	  (1991)	  reported	  reliability	  of	  r=0.80	  and	  Glicksohn	  and	  Barrett	  (2003)	  reported	  reliability	  of	  .84.	   	  
(Modified)	  Australian	  Sheep-­‐Goat	  Scale	  (ASGS;	  Thalbourne,	  2010):	  A	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  widely	  used	  Australian	  Sheep-­‐Goat	  Scale	  was	  used	  in	  this	  study	  to	  measure	  to	  measure	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  experience	  (available	  at	  http://www.wlv.ac.uk/PDF/sas_ASGS.pdf).	  This	  modified	  version	  had	  16	  rather	  than	  18	  true-­‐false	  items,	  scoring	  one	  point	  for	  every	  “true”	  response	  (the	  two	  items	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relating	  to	  belief	  in	  life	  after	  death	  were	  omitted).	  Example	  items	  are	  “I	  have	  had	  at	  least	  one	  dream	  that	  came	  true	  and	  which	  (I	  believe)	  was	  not	  just	  a	  coincidence.”	  As	  this	  version	  did	  not	  include	  a	  “don’t	  know”	  option	  for	  responses,	  scores	  could	  only	  range	  between	  0	  and	  16.	  Although	  other	  versions	  of	  the	  ASGS	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  reliable	  and	  valid	  (Thalbourne,	  2010)	  and	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  scores	  on	  the	  current	  version	  would	  correlate	  highly	  with	  the	  standard	  18-­‐item	  ASGS,	  no	  reliability	  and	  validity	  data	  from	  previous	  studies	  were	  available	  for	  this	  modified	  version.	  
Inattentional	  Blindness.	  A	  computerized	  IB	  task	  very	  similar	  to	  one	  used	  by	  Most	  et	  al.	  (2001;	  see	  Simons,	  2003)	  was	  employed	  in	  which	  black	  (distractor)	  and	  white	  (target)	  letters	  move	  around	  the	  screen,	  frequently	  hitting	  the	  frame.	  The	  video	  (see	  Figure	  1)	  began	  with	  a	  still	  frame	  for	  8	  s	  in	  which	  the	  starting	  positions	  of	  the	  targets	  and	  distractors	  were	  displayed.	   	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Still	  frame	  from	  the	  Inattentional	  blindness	  video	  showing	  the	  unexpected	  red	  cross	  traversing	  the	  screen.	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  The	  video	  began	  immediately	  following	  the	  still	  frame	  and	  lasted	  for	  25	  s.	  After	  7	  s	  of	  moving	  letters,	  a	  red	  cross	  appeared	  at	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  display	  and	  moved	  across	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  screen	  to	  the	  left	  hand	  side,	  where	  it	  disappeared	  11	  s	  later.	  Participants	  are	  instructed	  to	  ignore	  the	  four	  black	  letters	  and	  to	  silently	  count	  the	  times	  the	  four	  white	  letters	  'hit'	  the	  display	  frame.	   	  
Procedure	  Participants	  were	  tested	  individually	  in	  a	  cubicle.	  They	  completed	  the	  modified-­‐ASGS	  and	  TAS	  followed	  by	  the	  computerized	  IB	  task.	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  silently	  count	  the	  total	  number	  of	  'hits'	  (i.e.,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  times	  the	  white	  letters	  hit	  the	  frame	  on	  the	  video).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  task,	  participants	  were	  asked	  how	  many	  hits	  they	  counted	  and	  then	  asked	  whether	  they	  had	  seen	  anything	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  white	  and	  black	  letters.	  Those	  answering	  'no'	  were	  classified	  as	  IB,	  and	  those	  answering	  'yes,	  a	  red	  cross'	  were	  classified	  as	  NIB.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study,	  participants	  were	  fully	  debriefed.	   Results	  Of	  the	  91	  participants,	  39	  (43%)	  were	  inattentionally	  blind	  (IB)	  to	  the	  red	  stimulus	  whereas	  the	  remainder	  were	  non-­‐inattentionally	  blind	  (NIB).	  All	  participants	  correctly	  identified	  the	  number	  of	  hits	  (plus	  or	  minus	  2)	  in	  the	  primary	  IB	  task.	   	  	   IBs	  had	  higher	  absorption	  scores	  and	  higher	  modified-­‐ASGS	  scores	  (see	  Table	  1).	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   Inattentionally	  
Blind	  





N	  =	  52	  
(8	  males)	  
t(89)	   CI95	  
(Cohen	  
d)	  
Age	   21.59	  (3.73)	   21.42	  (7.46)	  	   0.13	   	  











5.64	  (3.04)	   3.46	  (2.80)	   3.50**	   1.0,	  3.4	  (0.75)	  	  
Table	  1.	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  Inattentionally	  Blind	  and	  Non-­‐Inattentionally	  Blind	  Groups	  for	  Study	  1	  (SDs	  in	  parentheses).	  **	  p=<.001	  These	  results	  support	  both	  of	  our	  hypotheses.	  A	  logistic	  regression	  analysis	  was	  performed	  with	  IB	  (IB	  coded	  as	  1	  and	  NIB	  as	  0)	  as	  the	  DV	  and	  TAS,	  modified-­‐ASGS	  scores,	  age	  and	  gender	  of	  participant	  (female	  coded	  as	  1	  and	  male	  as	  0)	  as	  IVs	  (see	  Table	  2).	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Predictor	   β 	  (Se)	   Wald	   	  
χ2	  
	  
p	   Odds	  Ratio	  
Exp(B)	  
95%	  C.I.	  for	  
Odds	  Ratio	  




	   0.24	  (0.06)	   15.51	   <.001	   1.27	   1.13	   1.43	  
Modified-­‐ASGS	  
(Paranormal	   	  
Belief)	  
	  
	   0.12	  (0.09)	   	   1.78	   ns	   1.13	   0.94	   1.35	  	  
Age	  
	  
	   0.03	  (0.04)	   	   0.52	   ns	   1.03	   0.95	   1.12	  
Gender	   	  
	  
-­‐0.08	  (0.70)	   	   0.01	   ns	   0.93	   0.24	   3.64	  
	  	  
Table	  2.	  Logistic	  Regression	  Predicting	  Inattentional	  Blindness	  from	  Absorption	  (TAS	  scale),	  paranormal	  Belief	  (modified-­‐ASGS),	  Age	  and	  Gender.	  	  The	  overall	  model	  was	  significant	  (Model	  =	  χ2(4)	  =	  34.15,	  p<.001),	  but	  only	  absorption	  predicted	  inattentional	  blindness.	  A	  one-­‐point	  increase	  in	  absorption	  results	  in	  a	  1.27	  unit	  change	  in	  the	  odds	  of	  being	  classified	  as	  IB.	  A	  mediation	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  the	  association	  between	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  inattentional	  blindness	  status	  was	  mediated	  by	  absorption	  (Sobel	  test	  =	  3.45,	  SE	  =	  .01,	  p	  <.001)	  whereas	  the	  direct	  association	  between	  absorption	  and	  inattentional	  blindness	  status	  was	  not	  mediated	  by	  paranormal	  belief	  (Sobel	  =	  1.26,	  SE	  =	  .004,	  p=.21).	   	  Finally,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  relationship	  between	  paranormal	  belief	  (modified	  ASGS)	  and	  absorption	  (TAS),	  r	  =	  0.44,	  p<.001,	  replicating	  an	  association	  reported	  by	  previous	  investigators	  using	  the	  18-­‐item	  version	  of	  the	  ASGS	  (e.g.,	  French,	  Santomauro,	  Hamilton,	  Fox,	  &	  Thalbourne,	  2008;	  Thalbourne,	  1998;	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Thalbourne,	  Bartemucci,	  Delin,	  Fox,	  &	  Nofi,	  1997).	  One	  concern	  was	  that	  that	  this	  correlation	  may	  be	  inflated	  due	  to	  overlapping	  items	  in	  the	  two	  scales,	  with	  the	  TAS	  containing	  some	  items	  that	  clearly	  tap	  into	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  (e.g.,	  “At	  times	  I	  somehow	  feel	  the	  presence	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  physically	  there.”).	  To	  address	  this,	  the	  overlapping	  items	  were	  removed	  from	  the	  TAS	  scores	  and	  the	  analyses	  performed	  again.	  There	  was	  no	  reduction	  in	  the	  prediction	  of	  inattentional	  blindness	  with	  the	  revised	  absorption	  scale	  (Wald	  statistic	  =	  15.08,	   	   Exp(B)	  =	  1.29).	  As	  expected,	  none	  of	  the	  other	  variables	  were	  significant	  predictors	  (all	  Wald	  statistics	  <	  2.64).	  The	  revised	  TAS	  scale	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  the	  modified	  ASGS	  (r	  =	  0.40,	  p<.001).	   Discussion	  IBs	  scored	  higher	  on	  absorption	  than	  NIBs.	  Furthermore,	  IBs	  had	  higher	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  scores	  than	  NIBs,	  supporting	  the	  suggestion	  that	  IB	  may	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  explaining	  some	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  experiences.	  However,	  when	  both	  absorption	  and	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  were	  entered	  into	  the	  regression,	  only	  absorption	  significantly	  predicted	  IB	  status.	  In	  addition,	  the	  mediation	  analysis	  confirmed	  an	  indirect	  relationship	  between	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  inattentional	  blindness	  via	  absorption.	  As	  predicted,	  absorption	  and	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  were	  correlated.	  However,	  when	  the	  items	  relating	  to	  paranormal	  belief	  were	  removed	  from	  the	  TAS,	  there	  was	  no	  reduction	  in	  the	  predictive	  power	  of	  this	  construct	  and	  paranormal	  belief	  did	  not	  predict	  IB	  status.	  	   	   These	  results	  are	  important	  as	  they	  are	  possibly	  the	  first	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  significant	  association	  between	  a	  personality	  trait	  (absorption)	  and	  susceptibility	  to	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IB.	  To	  check	  the	  replicability	  of	  these	  findings	  using	  the	  standard	  ASGS	  form,	  a	  second	  study	  was	  undertaken.	  Furthermore,	  Study	  2	  examined	  a	  possible	  underlying	  cognitive	  factor	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  both	  IB	  and	  absorption	  (and,	  indirectly,	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  paranormal	  belief/experience).	  Research	  has	  shown	  that	  low	  working	  memory	  capacity	  (WMC)	  is	  associated	  with	  IB	  (Hannon	  &	  Richards,	  2010;	  Richards,	  Hannon,	  &	  Derakshan,	  2010;	  Richards,	  Hannon,	  &	  Vitkovitch,	  2012;	  Seegmiller,	  Watson,	  &	  Strayer,	  2011).	  High	  WMC	  is	  associated	  with	  enhanced	  performance	  on	  central	  executive	  functioning	  tasks	  (Conway	  &	  Eagle,	  1994;	  Daneman	  &	  Carpenter,	  1980)	  and	  with	  effectively	  allocating	  attentional	  resources	  (Bleckley,	  Durso,	  Crutchfield,	  Engle,	  &	  Khanna,	  2003).	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  operation	  span	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  measures	  of	  fluid	  intelligence	  (e.g.,	  Conway	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Salthouse	  &	  Pink,	  2008;	  Unsworth,	  Heitz,	  Schrock,	  &	  Engle,	  2005).	  This	  suggests	  that	  individuals	  with	  low	  compared	  to	  high	  WMC	  need	  to	  devote	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  their	  cognitive	  resources	  to	  the	  primary	  task	  thus	  resulting	  in	  fewer	  resources	  being	  available	  to	  notice	  task-­‐irrelevant	  stimuli.	  Study	  2	  was	  a	  direct	  replication	  of	  Study	  1	  except	  that	  (a)	  WMC	  was	  assessed	  and	  (b)	  the	  standard	  18-­‐item	  true-­‐false	  version	  of	  the	  ASGS	  was	  used.	  This	  version	  of	  the	  ASGS	  is	  known	  to	  be	  reliable	  and	  valid	  (Thalbourne,	  2010).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  hypotheses	  of	  Study	  1,	  it	  was	  also	  hypothesised	  that	  IBs	  and	  NIBs	  would	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  WMC.	  We	  will	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  WMC,	  absorption,	  and	  paranormal	  belief	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  “cognitive	  deficits	  hypothesis”	  (Irwin,	  2009),	  i.e.,	  the	  notion	  that	  at	  least	  some	  aspects	  of	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  cognitive	  deficits	  on	  the	  part	  of	  believers.	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Study	  2	  
Method	  
Participants	  A	  total	  70	  participants	  were	  tested	  but	  4	  were	  excluded	  due	  to	  familiarity	  with	  IB	  research,	  leaving	  66	  participants	  (age	  range	  18	  to	  44;	  mean	  age	  =	  23.02;	  31	  females).	  
Stimuli	  &	  Materials	  Materials	  were	  identical	  to	  those	  in	  Study	  1	  except	  that	  (a)	  the	  standard	  18-­‐item	  True/don’t	  know/False	  version	  of	  the	  ASGS	  was	  administered	  (True	  =	  2	  points;	  don’t	  know	  =	  1	  point;	  False	  =	  no	  points)	  with	  a	  theoretical	  range	  of	  scores	  from	  zero	  to	  36	  and	  (b)	  WMC	  was	  measured	  with	  the	  widely	  used	  Automated	  Operation	  Span	  Task	  (AOSPAN;	  Unsworth,	  Heitz,	  Schrock,	  &	  Engle,	  2005).	  
Automated	  Operation	  Span	  Task	  (AOSPAN):	  This	  task	  measures	  working	  memory	  capacity	  (WMC).	  Participants	  complete,	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible,	  a	  series	  of	  arithmetic	  problems.	  Participants	  solve	  each	  problem	  and	  then	  click	  the	  mouse.	  An	  answer	  is	  presented	  on	  the	  screen	  and	  the	  participant	  decides	  if	  the	  solution	  is	  true	  or	  false	  by	  clicking	  the	  appropriate	  box.	  Each	  problem	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  letter	  that	  is	  recalled	  at	  a	  later	  stage.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  each	  trial	  (comprising	  between	  3	  and	  7	  problems),	  a	  4	  x	  3	  matrix	  of	  letters	  (F,	  H,	  J,	  K,	  L,	  N,	  P,	  Q,	  R,	  S,	  T,	  Y)	  is	  presented	  and	  participants	  click	  a	  box	  next	  to	  the	  appropriate	  letter	  in	  the	  exact	  order	  that	  the	  letters	  had	  appeared.	  Accuracy	  feedback	  is	  given.	  There	  are	  three	  practice	  blocks	  to	  train	  the	  participant	  and	  to	  calculate	  average	  solution	  time	  for	  the	  arithmetic	  problems.	  This	  average	  time	  (plus	  2.5	  SD)	  is	  then	  used	  as	  the	  time	  limit	  for	  the	  arithmetic	  portion	  of	  the	  task.	  
Inattentional	  Blindness,	  Absorption	   	   	   	   	  15	  
	   The	  test	  phase	  of	  the	  AOSPAN	  comprised	  set	  sizes	  of	  3,	  4,	  5,	  6	  and	  7	  items,	  each	  of	  which	  were	  presented	  3	  times.	  This	  gave	  a	  total	  of	  75	  trials	  with	  scores	  therefore	  ranging	  from	  0	  to	  75.	  The	  absolute	  AOSPAN	  score	  is	  calculated	  by	  adding	  the	  number	  of	  items	  that	  were	  reported	  in	  the	  correct	  order	  whereas	  the	  total	  score	  would	  be	  how	  many	  items	  were	  correctly	  reported	  without	  regard	  to	  their	  serial	  position	  (e.g.,	  if	  someone	  correctly	  recorded	  all	  items	  in	  the	  correct	  position	  for	  all	  sets	  except	  the	  3	  sets	  with	  7	  items,	  then	  their	  score	  would	  be	  54;	  if	  the	  7-­‐item	  sets	  had	  been	  recalled	  correctly	  but	  in	  the	  wrong	  order,	  then	  the	  total	  score	  would	  be	  75).	  This	  test	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  good	  test	  re-­‐test	  reliability	  and	  internal	  validity	  (alphas	  =	  0.83	  and	  0.78,	  respectively;	  Unsworth,	  Heitz,	  Schrock,	  &	  Engle,	  2005).	  
Procedure	  The	  procedure	  for	  Study	  2	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  for	  Study	  1	  except	  that	  participants	  additionally	  performed	  the	  AOSPAN	  task	  after	  completing	  the	  TAS	  and	  then	  completed	  the	  standard	  ASGS	  before	  performing	  the	  IB	  task.	   	  Results	  Of	  the	  66	  participants,	  32	  (48%)	  were	  IB	  to	  the	  red	  stimulus	  and	  the	  remaining	  participants	  were	  NIB.	  All	  participants	  correctly	  (plus	  or	  minus	  2)	  reported	  the	  number	  of	  target	  hits	  in	  the	  primary	  task.	   	  	   Consistent	  with	  Study	  1,	  IBs	  had	  higher	  absorption	  and	  higher	  ASGS	  scores	  than	  the	  NIBs.	  However,	  they	  had	  lower	  AOSPAN	  (see	  Table	  3).	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   Inattentionally	  
Blind	  





N	  =	  34	  
(21	  males)	  
t(64)	   CI95	  
(Cohen	  d)	  





39.50	  (10.39)	   52.03	  (11.67)	   	   	   4.60**	   7.1,	  17.97	  (1.13)	  
TAS	   	  
(Absorption)	  
	  






13.09	  (6.74)	   8.21	  (4.85)	   	   3.40**	   2.0,	  7.8	  (1.34)	  
	  
Table	  3.	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  Inattentionally	  Blind	  and	  Non-­‐Inattentionally	  Blind	  Groups	  for	  Study	  2	  (SDs	  in	  parentheses).	  **	  p=<.001.	  	  Both	  effects	  reported	  in	  Study	  1	  were	  replicated	  and	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  AOSPAN	  scores	  between	  IBs	  and	  NIBs	  in	  previous	  research	  was	  confirmed.	  	   	   As	  planned,	  a	  hierarchical	  logistic	  regression	  analysis	  with	  IB	  as	  the	  DV	  and	  TAS,	  ASGS	  and	  AOSPAN	  as	  IVs	  was	  performed.	  To	  confirm	  the	  findings	  in	  Study	  1,	  TAS	  was	  entered	  on	  the	  first	  step	  and	  ASGS	  and	  AOSPAN	  added	  on	  the	  second	  step	  (see	  Table	  4).	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Predictor	   β 	  (Se)	   Wald	   	  
χ2	  
	  
p	   Odds	  
Ratio	  
Exp(B)	  
95%	  C.I.	  for	  
Odds	  Ratio	  
Step	  1	   	   	   	   	   Lower	   Upper	  
TAS	   	  
(Absorption)	  
	   	  
	   0.14	  (0.04)	   10.00	   .002	   1.15	   1.05	   1.23	  	  
Step	  2	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
TAS	   	  
(Absorption)	  
	  









	   -­‐0.09	  (0.03)	   	   	   7.86	   .005	   0.91	   0.86	   0.97	  
	  	  
Table	  4.	  Hierarchical	  Logistic	  Regression,	  with	  Absorption	  entered	  on	  the	  first	  step	  and	  Paranromal	  Belief	  and	  Absorption	  added	  on	  the	  second	  step	  .	  
	  When	  TAS	  was	  entered	  on	  its	  own,	  it	  was	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  IB	  (Model	  =	  χ2(2)	  =	  12.50,	  p<.001;	  Wald	  statistic	  =	  10.00,	  p=.004,	  B	  =	  -­‐.14,	  Exp(B)	  =	  0.87,	  CI95	  =	  0.80,	  0.95).	  However,	  when	  AOSPAN	  and	  ASGS	  were	  then	  added	  the	  overall	  model	  was	  again	  significant	  (Model	  =	  χ2(3)	  =	  23.67,	  p<.001)	  but	  only	  AOSPAN	  predicted	  IB	  status	  (Wald	  statistic	  =	  7.86,	  p	  =	  .005,	  B	  =	  -­‐.09,	  Exp(B)	  =	  1.09,	  CI95	  =	  1.03,	  1.17)	  and	  both	  TAS	  and	  ASGS	  were	  non-­‐significant	  (Wald	  statistics	  of	  0.04	  and	  1.89,	  respectively,	  ps>.16).	   	  A	  mediation	  analysis	  was	  performed	  in	  which	  the	  association	  between	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  inattentional	  blindness	  status	  was	  significantly	  mediated	  by	  working	  memory	  capacity	  (Sobel	  test	  =	  2.04,	  SE	  =	  0.03,	  p	  =.042).	  In	  addition,	  there	  
	   18	  
was	  no	  mediating	  effect	  of	  paranormal	  belief	  on	  the	  direct	  predicting	  effect	  of	  working	  memory	  capacity	  on	  inattentional	  blindness	  status	  (Sobel	  test	  =	  -­‐1.66,	  SE	  =	  0.01,	  p=.10).	  Likewise,	  working	  memory	  capacity	  mediated	  the	  relationship	  between	  absorption	  and	  inattentional	  blindness	  (Sobel	  test	  =	  2.33,	  SE	  =	  .03,	  p	  =.019)	  but	  there	  was	  no	  converse	  mediation	  by	  absorption	  on	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  working	  memory	  capacity	  on	  inattentional	  blindness	  status	  (Sobel	  test	  =	  -­‐1.55,	  SE	  =	  0.01,	  
p=.12).	  	   	   Finally,	  significant	  correlations	  were	  found	  between	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  absorption	  (r	  =	  .74,	  p<.001),	  between	  absorption	  and	  AOSPAN	  (r	  =	  -­‐.41,	  p<.001),	  and	  between	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  AOSPAN	  (r	  =	  -­‐.32,	  p=.008).	   	  Discussion	  The	  incidence	  of	  IB	  was	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  Study	  1.	  Consistent	  with	  Study	  1,	  IBs	  had	  stronger	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  higher	  absorption	  scores	  than	  NIBs.	  There	  was	  also	  an	  inverse	  relationship	  between	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  WMC,	  suggesting	  that	  paranormal	  belief	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  reduction	  in	  working	  memory	  resources	  relative	  to	  the	  participant	  with	  higher	  working	  memory	  resources	  in	  the	  sample.	  Although	  absorption	  predicted	  IB	  when	  entered	  into	  the	  logistic	  regression	  alone,	  WMC	  underlies	  this	  relationship	  with	  absorption	  failing	  to	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  the	  prediction	  when	  WMC	  is	  included.	  
The	  working	  memory	  capacity	  scores	  for	  the	  IBs	  and	  NIBs	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  produced	  in	  similar	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Richards,	  Hannon,	  &	  Derakshan,	  2010,	  with	  AOSPAN	  scores	  of	  44.68	  and	  55.41	  for	  IBs	  and	  NIBs	  respectively	  (N=82)).	  In	  addition,	  the	  mean	  AOSPAN	  score	  for	  the	  IB	  group	  is	  smaller	  than	  the	  mean	  AOSPAN	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score	  in	  many	  published	  studies.	  For	  example,	  Shelton,	  Elliott,	  Hill,	  Calamia,	  and	  Gouvier	  (2009)	  reported	  an	  average	  AOSPAN	  score	  of	  44.15	  (N	  =	  174,	  SD	  =	  15.54)	  and	  Sanbonmatsu,	  Strayer,	  Medeiros-­‐Ward,	  and	  Watson	  (2013)	  reported	  a	  mean	  of	  44	  (N=277,	  SD	  =	  16).	  Our	  IB	  participants	  had	  significantly	  lower	  AOSPAN	  scores	  than	  Shelton	  et	  al.	  (t-­‐difference	  =	  -­‐2.13,	  mean	  difference	  =	  -­‐4.65,	  CI95	  =	  -­‐9.30,	  0.01)	  and	  Sanbonmatsu	  et	  al.	  (t-­‐difference	  =	  -­‐2.17,	  mean	  difference	  =	  -­‐4.50,	  CI95	  =	  -­‐8.93,	  -­‐0.37).	  Conversely,	  the	  average	  AOSPAN	  score	  for	  our	  NIB	  group	  (52.03)	  was	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  mean	  reported	  by	  both	  Shelton	  et	  al.	  (t-­‐difference	  =	  3.39,	  mean	  difference	  =	  7.88,	  CI95	  =	  3.33,	  12.43)	  and	  Sanbonmatsu	  et	  al.	  (t-­‐difference	  =	  3.62,	  mean	  difference	  =	  8.03,	  CI95	  =	  3.68,	  12.38).	  These	  comparisons	  suggest	  that	  performance	  on	  the	  AOSPAN	  for	  the	  IB	  group	  was	  significantly	  lower	  than	  average	  and	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  cognitive	  deficit	  explanation	  of	  inattentional	  blindness	  and,	  indirectly,	  of	  paranormal	  belief.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  mean	  AOSPAN	  scores	  for	  the	  IB	  group	  was	  not	  lower	  than	  the	  mean	  of	  39.16	  (N	  =	  252)	  as	  reported	  by	  Unsworth,	  Heitz,	  Schrock	  and	  Engle	  (2005).	   	  
Working	  memory	  capacity	  appears	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  inattentional	  blindness	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  other	  studies	  that	  there	  are	  additional	  factors	  at	  work.	  For	  example,	  people	  with	  high	  working	  memory	  capacity	  may	  be	  inattentionally	  blind	  and	  this	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  reduction	  in	  working	  memory	  resources.	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  status	  of	  the	  unexpected	  stimulus	  in	  the	  standard	  inattentional	  blindness	  task	  is	  ambiguous	  and	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  more	  efficient	  performer	  should	  process	  it	  and	  remember	  it	  or	  process	  it	  and	  forget	  it.	  Some	  of	  our	  recent	  work	  has	  manipulated	  the	  relevancy	  of	  the	  unexpected	  change	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and	  shown	  that	  when	  the	  unexpected	  change	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  then	  people	  with	  high	  working	  memory	  capacity	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  report	  having	  seen	  it	  whereas	  when	  the	  unexpected	  change	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  task,	  individuals	  with	  high	  working	  memory	  are	  actually	  less	  likely	  to	  report	  having	  noticed	  it	  (Richards,	  Hannon,	  Iqbal	  Vohra,	  &	  Golan,	  2013).	   	  
Given	  the	  facts	  that	  susceptibility	  to	  IB	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  related	  to	  WMC	  in	  this	  and	  several	  previous	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Hannon	  &	  Richards,	  2010;	  Richards	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  2012;	  Seegmiller	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  and	  that	  WMC	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  fluid	  intelligence	  (e.g.,	  Conway	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Salthouse	  &	  Pink,	  2008;	  Unsworth	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  in	  future	  IB	  studies	  to	  include	  direct	  measures	  of	  fluid	  intelligence.	  Furthermore,	  this	  pattern	  of	  findings	  might	  suggest	  that	  paranormal	  belief/experience	  is	  strongly	  related	  to	  fluid	  intelligence.	  Although	  a	  few	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Musch	  &	  Ehrenberg,	  2002;	  Smith,	  Foster,	  &	  Stovin,	  1998)	  have	  reported	  results	  consistent	  with	  this	  possibility,	  other	  studies	  have	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  (e.g.,	  Jones,	  Russell,	  &	  Nickel,	  1977;	  Stuart-­‐Hamilton,	  Nayak,	  &	  Priest,	  2006).	  In	  general,	  it	  appears	  that	  there	  is	  at	  present	  little	  strong	  support	  for	  such	  a	  direct	  link	  between	  intelligence	  and	  paranormal	  belief	  (French	  &	  Stone,	  2014;	  Irwin,	  2009)	  although	  there	  is	  a	  paucity	  of	  research	  into	  this	  basic	  issue.	  
There	  are,	  of	  course,	  inherent	  limitations	  in	  correlational	  research,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  determine	  causality.	  In	  the	  current	  research,	  we	  have	  measured	  personality	  traits	  and	  cognitive	  performance	  without	  any	  attempt	  at	  manipulation.	  This	  restricts	  the	  conclusions	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  and	  it	  is	  thus	  not	  possible	  to	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definitively	  conclude	  that	  having	  a	  low	  working	  memory	  score	  leads	  to	  either	  inattentional	  blindness	  or,	  indirectly,	  to	  a	  propensity	  to	  believe	  in	  paranormal	  phenomenon.	  Having	  said	  that,	  such	  an	  account	  is	  inherently	  plausible	  
	   General	  Discussion	  In	  two	  studies,	  higher	  absorption	  and	  paranormal	  belief	  were	  associated	  with	  the	  failure	  to	  notice	  an	  unexpected	  stimulus	  appearing	  in	  the	  visual	  field.	  Both	  studies	  showed	  that	  absorption	  was	  important	  in	  predicting	  IB,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  effect	  is	  replicable.	  The	  IBs	  scored	  more	  highly	  than	  NIBs	  on	  paranormal	  belief/experience,	  supporting	  the	  suggestion	  that	  IB	  may	  sometimes	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  reports	  of	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  experiences.	  The	  reported	  findings	  are	  particularly	  noteworthy	  as	  they	  are	  arguably	  the	  first	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  link	  between	  susceptibility	  to	  IB	  and	  a	  personality	  variable	  (i.e.,	  absorption).	  Study	  2	  confirmed	  and	  extended	  the	  findings	  of	  Study	  1	  and	  confirmed	  previous	  findings	  (Hannon	  &	  Richards,	  2010;	  Richards	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  2012)	  indicating	  that	  low	  WMC	  is	  a	  determining	  factor	  in	  producing	  IB.	  We	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  although	  belief	  in	  the	  paranormal	  is	  associated	  with	  high	  absorption,	  there	  is	  an	  underlying	  cognitive	  deficit	  in	  WMC.	  Low	  WMC	  may	  render	  the	  individual	  effectively	  blind	  to	  events	  that	  are	  causally	  related	  to	  an	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  encounter	  because	  only	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  information	  from	  the	  environment	  is	  attended	  to	  and	  fully	  processed.	  The	  failure	  to	  perceive	  and	  remember	  causally	  connecting	  events,	  such	  as	  someone	  moving	  an	  object	  from	  one	  location	  to	  another,	  may	  encourage	  a	  paranormal	  interpretation.	  Alternatively,	  absorption	  may	  be	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linked	  to	  paranormal	  belief	  and	  reports	  of	  ostensibly	  paranormal	  experiences	  via	  other	  routes,	  such	  as	  the	  association	  between	  absorption	  and	  hallucinatory	  tendencies	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  that	  between	  absorption	  and	  susceptibility	  to	  false	  memories	  on	  the	  other.	  Future	  research	  should	  attempt	  to	  distinguish	  between	  these	  various	  possibilities.	  The	  present	  research	  did	  not	  record	  race	  and	  ethnicity	  data,	  and	  therefore	  the	  generalizability	  of	  the	  current	  findings	  are	  somewhat	  limited.	  Future	  research	  should	  ensure	  that	  full	  demographic	  details	  are	  recorded.	  In	  addition,	  the	  current	  research	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  possible	  influence	  of	  contextual	  factors.	  The	  questionnaires	  were	  administered	  together	  in	  one	  experimental	  session,	  which	  increases	  the	  possibility	  of	  inflating	  the	  correlations	  between	  the	  various	  measures	  (Council,	  1993;	  Council,	  Kirsch,	  &	  Hainer,	  1986).	  These	  potential	  context	  effects	  should	  be	  avoided	  in	  future	  research	  by	  administering	  the	  key	  questionnaires	  in	  independent	  experimental	  contexts.	  This	  procedure	  would	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  that	  participants	  will	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  possible	  connections	  between	  the	  different	  measures.	  The	  current	  research	  should	  be	  performed	  under	  conditions	  where	  context	  effects	  have	  been	  controlled	  to	  assess	  the	  generalizability	  of	  the	  findings.	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